A grand master asks the tournament organizers to pay him by placing one penny on the first white square of a chess board, two pennies on the second white square, four on the third white square, proceeding until all thirty-two white squares are covered. the initial penny would double in value thirty-one times, resulting in more than $21 million being laid on the last white square. Growth compounds faster than the mind can grasp. compounded over a century, 2 per cent annual growth increases wealth more than seven times, which is roughly the growth rate of the United States in the previous cen tury, and 10 percent annual growth increases wealth almost fourteen thousand times, which is roughly the growth rate of china in the last thirty years. capita of approximately $25,000 and the poorest countries had approxi mately $500, for a ratio of 50:1.
grow faster than poor nations, the gap between them will widen sur prisingly quickly. income per capita declined in sub-Saharan Africa by roughly 20 percent between 1970 and 1990, which is one of history's fail ures. Growth has resumed in Africa, but not at a rate that will overtake rich countries.
How does an economy grow? through business ventures.
2 A bold ship's captain in seventeenth-century england proposes to investors in a port town that they finance a voyage to Asia for spices. 3 the voyage is inherently risky. Weather is uncertain and channels are uncharted. the Dutch prey on english ships, the english prey on Dutch ships, and other pirates prey on both of them. if, however, the captain returns to the eng lish port with a cargo of spices, they will be worth a fortune. the ship's captain must convince the investors that he can do it. He needs a large ship outfitted for two to five years of travel. to convince them, he dis closes secrets about how to get to Asia and what to do when he arrives.
the captain must trust the investors with his secrets, and the investors must trust the captain with the ship and its supplies.
this is a double trust dilemma. to solve it, the captain and the inves tors form a new kind of firm invented in the seventeenth century for the spice voyages: a joint stock company. 4 the participants-investors, captain, and crew-are legally entitled to shares of the hoped-for cargo.
Some participants have larger shares than others, depending on their contributions. With these legal arrangements, the investors stand to gain more from the success of the voyage than by selling the captain's secrets.
Similarly, the captain stands to gain more from the success of the voyage than by stealing the ship and its cargo. Self-interest enforces the commit ment of the parties to the voyage.
It's about the Economy
Unlike so many other ships that sail for Asia, this one returns safely after two years. the townspeople spot the vessel sailing toward the har bor and the investors rush to the dock to keep watch over the cargo. they immediately hold a meeting of shareholders called a "general court." it divides the cargo among the shareholders, they leave the dock with their spices, and the company dissolves.
Similarly, an engineer in Silicon valley in 1985 has an idea for a new computer technology. the engineer cannot patent the idea until he devel ops it. Developing it requires more money than the engineer can risk personally. He drafts a business plan and meets with a small group of investors. the engineer fears that the investors will steal his idea, and the investors fear that the engineer will steal their money. Besides the fear of betrayal, developing the idea is inherently risky-it might fail or some one else might patent the idea first. if the innovation succeeds, however, it will be worth a fortune. Besides new organizations, adaptations often create new contracts.
the textile business in Bangladesh relies on two new contracts: bonds for warehousing and back-to-back letters of credit. 6 Bonded warehouses protect producers against theft or fraud in the chain of distribution, and letters of credit protect buyers against theft or fraud at the point of sale.
in business, adaptation is creative and risky. the adapter has an idea that is new to a developing country. Proving its worth in the marketplace requires risky investment. the investment often goes to building an orga nization embedding the new idea. the innovator must trust the investor not to steal his organization, and the investor must trust the innovator not to steal his money. if the adaptation succeeds, it attracts competitors, who diffuse the idea and reduce the innovator's profits. Adaptation in developing countries thus faces many of the same obstacles as invention in developed countries.
instead of adaptation, some people imagine that developing coun tries can grow by imitation that is mechanical and safe. if growth were this simple, poor countries would already be rich. in poor and rich coun tries alike, new business ventures mostly fail and the investors lose their money, whereas a few succeed spectacularly and drive growth. Picking out the adaptation that will succeed in Africa is just as hard as picking out the invention that will succeed in Silicon valley. It's about the Economy calculate a monthly fee that he must pay them to "protect his shop from hooligans." if he does not pay, they will destroy his shop. the shopkeeper pays and his business succeeds.
Unlike diamond thieves, Moscow criminals who sell security do not want to take everything from their clients. Selling protection presupposes something to protect. in this example, the Moscow criminals impose a "security tax" that leaves room for the shopkeeper to succeed. When organized criminals provide security, however, the "tax" is much higher than when a successful state provides it. (not to mention the dangers of competing "protectors.") When providing security, the Moscow criminals burden business more heavily than a successful state. Security is a "natu ral monopoly," which means that states can provide it more cheaply and reliably than private parties. Private security of property is better than anarchy but worse than effective state law.
Indonesian Textiles: in Jakarta in 1987, a businessman manufactures cloth, makes the cloth into dresses, hand-decorates them, and exports the finished product. the entire process occurs inside a single factory where cotton and silk come in the door and deco rated dresses go out the door. Managers in the factory are mostly relatives of the owner. rural households outside Jakarta would do the hand-decorations at lower wages than factory workers in the city. the businessman, however, is unwilling to leave the dresses in rural households in exchange for a promise to decorate them. the indonesian businessman in this example gathers everyone needed to produce a particular product into a single factory, where his relatives can monitor them. in countries with weak legal institutions, economic cooperation usually involves people with personal ties, espe cially relatives and friends. Most people, however, do not have enough relatives and friends to achieve the scale of activity required for affluence.
Weak contract law can keep trade local and organizations small. Property and contract law lower the cost of monitoring and extend cooperation to strangers, which facilitates dispersed production, larger organizations, and wider markets.
Mexican Loan: A poor man in Mexico city needs a loan to buy a refrig erator for storing food that he sells on the street. Before loaning the money, the lender needs security against the debtor's failure to repay. the legal process for repossessing the refrigerator from a defaulting debtor is too slow and unreliable. instead, the lender requires the borrower to provide telephone numbers and addresses of his family, friends, and business associates. if the borrower falls behind in payments, the lender will use the borrower's family and friends to pressure him to repay the loan, and, if necessary, the lender will use their influence to repossess the refrigerator. the impracticality of collecting debts through courts plagues busi nesses in poor countries. Mexican debtors often gain by stringing out the legal process because courts assess low interest rates on delays in collecting court judgments. High-cost debt collection can dry up loans to small businesses like the Mexican street vendor. in this example, how ever, the parties found a way around debt collection through the courts: rely on family and friends. one of Mexico's richest businessmen, ricardo Salinas, began to build his fortune by figuring out how to collect debts from poor people who buy consumer durables, so household appliances became available to more people.
A different kind of financial problem known as the "soft-budget con straint" exists in countries with a socialist tradition:
Chinese Steel: in 2000, the government privatizes a steel company in northern china by creating stock and divides it three ways. 33 per cent is sold to the public who can resell freely ("tradable" shares), 47 percent is allocated to the government, and 20 percent is allo cated to insiders who cannot sell ("nontradable" shares). After privatization, the steel company keeps losing money. its manag ers, who have political influence, pressure a state bank to finance its losses by buying its bonds, which are commercially unsound. Ecuadorian Stocks: A family owns a successful shrimp farm in the coastal mangrove swamps on the Gulf of Guayaquil. to grow faster in the 1990s, the business needs more capital, either from borrowing money or selling stock. if the family sells stock, inves tors will receive dividends when shrimp prices rise, and nothing when shrimp prices fall. if the family gets a loan, the lender must receive periodic payments, regardless of whether shrimp prices rise or fall. the small size of the ecuadorian stock market pre cludes selling stock, and the family regards a loan as too risky, so it foregoes outside finance and grows more slowly.
Why are stock markets so small in countries like ecuador? When you invest in a company that you do not control, you run the risk that insid ers will appropriate your investment. investment in stocks makes the problem especially hard to solve. Stocks entitle their owners to a share of profits, but a company's managers can hide profits. A stock market cannot flourish unless corporate and securities laws effectively protect noncontrolling investors. compared to stocks, loans and bonds reduce the problem of protecting outsiders against insiders. Loans and bonds Chapter 1 entitle the lenders to repayment according to a fixed schedule. Monitor ing repayment is relatively easier for courts and other legal officials with the will to protect lenders. the credit market can flourish under condi tions where the stock market languishes. However, borrowing is more risky for an entrepreneur than selling stocks, so weak stock markets dampen investment and slow the pace of innovation, as illustrated by the ecuadorian shrimp farm.
As the examples suggest, this book tells the story of how insecure Law for the economy should be designed mostly to maximize wealth, not improve tastes or increase happiness.
A single phrase from the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign of Bill clin ton famously summarizes our approach in this book: "it's the economy, stupid."
